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Madrid: A European capital embracing integration

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ABSTRACT

Over the last decade, integration has attracted considerable attention from policymakers and academics. This paper highlights the importance of migrants as the primary stakeholders in the complex process of integration and stresses the need for investment in inclusion and education policies to help migrants to settle and the host society to accept newcomers. More specifically, it analyses the data collected from face-to-face interviews conducted on 10 and 11 November 2009 with migrants and integration practitioners in Madrid and assesses the outcome of the integration schemes put in place by the Spanish government and regional and local authorities over the last six years.

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Madrid: A European capital embracing integration

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1. Setting the scene in Madrid

(a) Choice of Madrid and the sample

Madrid was chosen as the place for conducting a survey on integration for two main reasons. First, Madrid had received a mass influx of migrants within a very short time. Over the period 2000–10, the Spanish population in Madrid increased by 13.5 %, while the non-EU population rose almost sixfold. This increase has put a tremendous strain on the city. Second, the Spanish government and local authorities, aided by other major stakeholders, responded to this challenge by putting in place specifically designed integration schemes geared to social inclusion of newcomers. Thus, Madrid has become a fascinating melting pot, where the quality of responses to promote integration and the results can be assessed.

This paper draws on data and information collected during several interviews with representatives of the Spanish Ministry of Labour and Immigration, with 131 non-EU nationals living and working in Madrid and with a number of representatives of migrants' associations, non-profit organisations, charities and trade unions conducted on 10 and 11 November 2009. The sample draws on the data collected by two surveys. The first, designed for migrants, asked nine questions on how migrants relate to each other, to other ethnic groups and to the host society as a whole and on their levels of education and whether they have been victims of discrimination (see Annex I). The second survey, prepared for integration practitioners, consisted of five questions to assess the main difficulties they face in the course of their duties, their level of education, their professional experience of integration work, their day-to-day work contacts with migrants and their knowledge of foreign languages (see Annex II). The names and other details of the respondents have been omitted to preserve their anonymity.

Although the sample is fairly small, it provides an overview of the integration process in Madrid ([2]). The accuracy of the results depended mainly on the willingness of the non-EU nationals to cooperate freely. To this end, face-to-face interviews were conducted on the premises of migrants' associations where it was felt that the random sample of migrants would be more willing to tell the truth, recount anecdotes and provide reasonably accurate information. Men and women of different ages, professions and migration status were interviewed. They had all arrived in Madrid in the last 20 years. These interviews were based on a questionnaire designed to

([2]) Since the sample is small, it would be unwise to draw policy conclusions that go beyond the case of Madrid. It could even be argued that the limited size of the sample has produced biased results. The purpose of this study was to try to assess the integration schemes put in place by the Spanish authorities in response to the mass influx of migrants and to take a snapshot of the situation of migrants and integration practitioners in the current economic circumstances. Seeking to extract any policy conclusion that departs from the specific case of Madrid could therefore be misleading and arbitrary.

obtain information on various aspects of the integration process in Spain and served a twofold objective: first, to focus on how non-EU nationals see the integration measures taken in recent years by the Spanish government and Madrid City Council and, second, to understand how Spanish integration practitioners, migrants' associations, government officials, employers and trade unions deal with integration issues.

(b) The institutional framework in Spain

For a fuller understanding of the results of the survey, readers also need to be aware of the measures and integration schemes implemented by Spain. First of all, Spain has a Secretary of State responsible for migration and integration issues, who works in close cooperation with the Minister of Labour and Immigration, who coordinates Spanish government policy on migration and integration. There are also two consultative bodies engaged in integration: the Sectoral Conference on Immigration ([3]), which is a platform for cultivating cooperation and dialogue between the central government and the regional and local authorities, and the Forum for the Social Integration of Immigrants, which is an advisory body for the government. The Forum also brings together all the major stakeholders, including representatives of migrants' associations, non-governmental organisations, trade unions and members of the public administration ([4]).

Turning to the Spanish legislation, although the central government has exclusive jurisdiction over migration law ([5]), the Spanish legal framework provides for many stakeholders when it comes to integration schemes. It must be stressed, however, that any developments in integration policy must comply fully with the norms and principles set out in migration law. This legislative setting has not prevented the regional authorities and city councils responsible for social welfare, education, labour, health and housing issues from putting together their own integration schemes ([6]). It comes as no surprise that this gradual transfer of responsibilities for integration from central to regional governments, which is both politically charged and complex, has sometimes created coordination problems. These issues have led to a plethora of integration schemes which differ greatly from one region to another. This was the main criticism voiced by the integration practitioners interviewed. In the case of Madrid, however, this analysis found that both the Spanish government and Madrid City Council genuinely share the same set of objectives, in particular with regard to making the integration process smoother, more effective and beneficial for all stakeholders.

([3]) Conferencia Sectorial de Inmigración.

([4]) This includes representatives from central, regional and local administrations.

([5]) The first law on the rights and freedoms of foreigners in Spain (Ley 7/85) entered into force on 1 July 1985 and set out the guiding principles for the legislation on migration. The second, which was enacted on 11 January 2000 (Ley 4/2000), introduced a more flexible quota system to meet evolving labour market needs plus more advantageous conditions for all migrants residing in Spain, irrespective of their legal status. These laws granted migrants new social rights, including access to education, public health and social assistance. The recently adopted Ley 2/2009 amended Ley 4/2000 by transposing a number of EU directives into Spain's national law, adapting the Spanish migration law to the decisions by the Spanish High Court and including integration in the body of the Spanish migration law.

([6]) In this context, it should be mentioned that Catalonia was the first autonomous community to put in place its own regional integration scheme in 1993.

(c) Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration

The Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration drawn up by the Spanish government for the period 2007–10 ([7]) has indisputably helped to establish a social context conducive to greater inclusion and closer integration ([8]). The 11 common basic principles underpinning the EU's integration framework have also been taken into account in this plan ([9]). The main components of this plan are not only specifically designed policy responses to address a given set of issues, but also the underlying framework to help shape the environment in which all stakeholders play their part. In other words, the great advantages of this plan are its holistic nature and the incentives it provides, which have encouraged stakeholders to play by a given set of norms and principles. The ultimate objective was to step up cooperation between stakeholders, to minimise free-riding and to establish a level playing field or 'integration infrastructure', where all the migrant groups targeted can reap economic and social benefits if they abide by the norms and principles set out in the plan ([10]). This integration infrastructure, bolstered by well-funded and well-crafted integration schemes, has allowed Spain to install a new and effective modus operandi for dealing with migration and integration issues. As James Coleman put it, 'social capital comes about through changes in the relations among persons that facilitate action' ([11]).

Twelve major areas of action ([12]) were identified and subsequently divided into more specific objectives to be attained during the period 2007–10. In conclusion, this strategic plan, accompanied by the Plan on Social and Intercultural Coexistence put together by Madrid City Council, has generated a certain degree of social capital in the area of integration ([13]). As this analysis shows, Spanish authorities at all levels need to continue their valiant efforts to promote integration still further and to build trust between migrant communities and between Spanish citizens ([14]) and migrants. However, it would be unfair to play down the great achievements already brought about by their genuine political commitment and the quality of their integration schemes, in particular considering the limited time Spanish society has had to adapt and respond to the challenges posed by the mass influx of newcomers.

([7]) The plan was approved by the Spanish Council of Ministers on 16 February 2007.

([8]) The Spanish government set aside EUR 2 billion to fund this strategic plan.

([9]) 'A Common Agenda for Integration: Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union', COM(2005) 389 final, Brussels, 1.9.2005. See also 2618th Council meeting (Justice and Home Affairs), 14615/04 (Presse 321), Brussels, 19.11.2004.

([10]) The principles of equality, non-discrimination, citizenship and interculturality underpinned the Spanish strategic plan.

([11]) See Coleman, J.S. (1988): 'Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity but a variety of different entities, with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspects of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors — whether persons or corporate actors — within the structure. Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be possible.' See also Putnam, R.D., *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 2000. This book looks at the causes that have broken down the bonds of social structure in American society.

([12]) Reception, education, employment, housing, social services, health, childhood and youth, equal treatment, women, participation, awareness-raising and co-development.

([13]) The concept 'social capital' is also employed by World Bank experts to gauge economic and societal development.

([14]) As Zapata-Barrero put it, 'also citizens need to be multicultural'. See page 244, Zapata-Barrero, R., 'Spanish challenges and European dilemma: Socialising the debate on the integration of immigrants', *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, Vol. 4, Issue 2, May 2003.

Another point to be stressed is that migrant communities tend to respond to a given system of incentives, which can obviously take different forms. In the case of Spain, this system of incentives provides a solid platform for bringing together all stakeholders and devising specifically designed integration schemes. Obviously, should the scale of this integration infrastructure be limited or should policy measures be interrupted or the number and scope of such measures be reduced, then there is a risk that the social capital that has been generated so far will start to fade away quite rapidly. In this plan, Spain has rightly asked migrant communities to work together to shape a common future, as the clash of cultures and deep-seated distrust usually leads to failure and sometimes to social unrest. It is therefore essential for the Spanish authorities to continue with this well-devised plan, within the means available to them, as half-hearted commitment will not produce the desired results.

(d) Plan on Social and Intercultural Coexistence

In 2004, Madrid City Council launched its first Plan on Social and Intercultural Coexistence ([15]), which was geared to establishing a more favourable environment for the migrant workers who were flocking to the Spanish capital ([16]). The city council invested more than EUR 40 million in measures and programmes implementing its first plan, which ended in 2006. An evaluation of the first plan was carried out in 2007. On this basis, the City Council drew up a second Plan on Social and Intercultural Coexistence covering the period 2009–12 and building on the experience acquired from implementing the first.

It must be stressed that the economic environments in which the two plans were drawn up and implemented were very different. For example, the 2004 macroeconomic and employment indicators portrayed a country that was financially robust and had promising growth prospects. Migration and integration issues were in the spotlight and hotly debated in newspapers and on radio and television talk shows. Today, rising unemployment and a grim economic outlook have become the main concerns of the Spanish government and regional and local authorities, not to mention the man in the street. The point is that, even in a perilous financial situation, both the government and Madrid City Council have had the nous to continue their valiant efforts to help newcomers and migrants integrate into the socioeconomic fabric of the country. Despite those efforts, however, more than half the migrants interviewed felt that they had been victims of discrimination ([17]) in Madrid at least once.

Another goal of this research was to examine the working and living conditions of non-EU migrants in Madrid. Madrid has seen a mass influx of migrants over a span of 10 years and has been hit hard by the current crisis, in particular in the form of job losses in leading sectors of the economy. In 2000, for example, there were over

([15]) The first 'Plan Madrid de Convivencia Social e Intercultural' started with the first Social Forum, which was organised in October 2003.

([16]) Between 2000 and 2004, the non-EU population in Madrid increased from 100 183 to 427 692.

([17]) For the purpose of the survey, the definition of discrimination given in the Random House dictionary was applied: 'Treatment or consideration of, or making a distinction in favour of or against, a person or thing based on the group, class or category to which that person or thing belongs rather than on individual merit.'

100 000 migrants living in Madrid, making up 3.45 % of Madrid's total population. By 1 January 2010, there were 571 818 non-EU citizens, i.e. over 17 % of the city's inhabitants. Over the period 2000–10, the Spanish population in Madrid increased by 13.5 %, while the non-EU population rose almost sixfold. It must also be stressed that on 1 January 2010 the biggest age group in Madrid was 30–44 year olds, who make up 40 % of the total population of migrants or 231 161 people ([18]). Table 1 provides figures for the sharp increase registered over the period 2000–10 in the non-EU population living and working legally in Madrid.

TABLE 1

Year	Total population	Non-EU population	Non-EU as % of total
2010 (*)	3 298 004	571 818	17.34
2009	3 273 006	571 913	17.47
2008	3 238 208	547 282	16.90
2007	3 187 062	505 572	15.86
2006	3 205 334	507 054	15.82
2005	3 167 424	452 616	14.29
2004	3 162 304	427 692	13.52
2003	3 124 892	362 155	11.59
2002	3 043 535	286 440	9.41
2001	2 982 926	194 297	6.51
2000	2 903 903	100 163	3.45

(*) On 1 January 2010.
Source: Madrid City Council

Besides the mass influx of migrants within such a short period, two other aspects need to be looked at to give a clearer overall picture of the nature of migration flows into Madrid ([19]). This will also help to highlight the attendant integration challenges which the city of Madrid, together with the Spanish government and the autonomous region of Madrid, have had to cope with within a very limited time. Each city and each small town needs to adapt its 'integration response' to the specifics of the challenges it faces. As with other areas, 'one size fits all' rarely applies to integration and migration issues. Every national, regional and local government must be capable of fashioning its own integration schemes, which need to be based on the fullest dataset possible. Informed decisions generally enjoy the greatest success.

It follows that research projects on migration and integration matters should be promoted and funded in all major 'migration hubs' in order to gain a picture of

([18]) The 0–14 age group makes up over 12 %, while 15–29 year olds account for almost 30 %. The remaining 17 % of non-EU nationals were 45 or older.
([19]) In this context, it is noteworthy that the autonomous regions of Andalucia, Catalonia, Madrid and Valencia host 65.75 % of all registered migrants living in Spain, including EU citizens.

the nature and dimension of migration flows and the inherent challenges and opportunities. In the case of Madrid, seven of the top 10 non-EU nationalities making up the migrant population are from Latin America or 80 % in terms of numbers. This comes as no surprise, as language skills and family ties play a major role in determining the choice of destination for a large number of migrants ([20]). Table 2 lists the most numerous non-EU nationalities living in Madrid.

TABLE 2

Non–EU nationalities	Total number (1 January 2010)	Percentage of total
Ecuador	87 139	26.46
Peru	40 044	12.16
Bolivia	38 837	11.79
Colombia	36 005	10.93
China	29 120	8.84
Morocco	26 585	8.07
Dominican Republic	24 259	7.37
Paraguay	21 891	6.65
Brazil	15 382	4.67
Philippines	10 052	3.05

Source: Madrid City Council

The second aspect concerns the geographical distribution of migrants in Madrid. Data were gathered specifically to see where migrants have settled. The city of Madrid is made up of 21 *distritos*, each with an average population of around 150 000. Each *distrito* is divided into neighbourhoods (*barrios*). There are a total of 128 *barrios*, each with an average population of some 25 000. Table 3 shows the five *barrios* where the density of the non-EU population is over 30 % ([21]).

TABLE 3

Barrios	No of registered migrants	% of non-EU population
San Cristóbal	7 021	41.40
Pradolongo	6 143	34.16
Almendrales	7 749	34.09
Embajadores	16 909	33.49
San Diego	14 156	33.03

Source: Madrid City Council

([20]) This was also confirmed by a 2009 study published by the German Marshall Fund of the United States entitled 'Transatlantic trends – immigration'. Available on the Internet (http://www.gmfus.org/trends/immigration/doc/TTI_2009_Key.pdf).

([21]) The figures in Table 3 are for January 2010.

2. International setting: a short overview

Given the importance of integration to future, multicultural, European societies, the author wholeheartedly sides with others who encourage EU governments, with the aid of regional and local authorities and EU institutions, to continue to carry out this sort of research and analysis in a bid to gain a clearer understanding of the integration challenges that lie ahead in Europe ([22]). Discussing migration and integration without being aware of the real size, nature and 'unintended' consequences ([23]) of these challenges is bound to add confusion to an already complex public debate, to mislead public perception of migration flows and to delay the policymaking process needed to find long-lasting solutions. Instead, the debate on integration needs to be based on knowledge, up-to-date datasets, clarity of purpose and ways in which host societies should improve their 'welcome packages' for lawfully residing migrants and newcomers.

Migrants can contribute to economic growth, but their full potential cannot be realised unless they are given an opportunity to integrate into the host societies and economies of the Member States ([24]). This means that local and regional authorities must be a central part of Europe's integration strategy, as integration usually takes place in cities and small towns. Integration of legally resident migrants therefore needs to remain a top priority and a key part of the EU's comprehensive migration policy. To this end, measures and programmes need to be put together to offer migrants robust 'integration infrastructure', which will pave the way for their inclusion in the socioeconomic fabric of their host society. This is all the truer in times of economic crisis when migrants and the associations that defend their rights in host societies are also exposed to growing anti-immigrant sentiment among EU citizens. In January 2009, for example, Scottish workers demonstrated against employing foreign labour. Similar demonstrations were also staged by Spanish employees who objected to shipyards hiring Portuguese and Romanian workers, who are nonetheless fellow EU citizens ([25]). These examples epitomise the need to put in place a robust 'integration infrastructure' that is capable of weathering these deplorable xenophobic and discriminatory storms.

([22]) As Luigi Einaudi, former President of the Italian Republic, used to say 'conoscere per deliberare' ('know the facts before you decide').

([23]) From the latest data compiled by the Population Division of the United Nations, international migrants are set to number 213 943 812 by 2010. The increase of 47 975 034 international migrants registered over the period 1995–2010 has moved their number up from 2.9 % of the total world population in 1995 to 3.1 % in 2010.

([24]) 'To design and implement programmes to promote social innovation for the most vulnerable, in particular by providing innovative education, training and employment opportunities for deprived communities, to fight discrimination (e.g. disabled) and to develop a new agenda for migrants' integration to enable them to take full advantage of their potential', see European Commission, 'Europe 2020: A European strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth', SEC(2010) 246 final, Brussels, 4.3.2010. Available on the Internet (http://ec.europa.eu/eu2020/pdf/COMPLET%20EN%20BARROSO%20%20%20007%20-%20Europe%202020%20-%20EN%20version.pdf).

([25]) 'The global economic crisis and migrant workers: impact and response', International Labour Organisation, July 2009, Geneva.

Contraction of the world economy, coupled with a surge in xenophobic attitudes, has prompted some EU countries ([26]), to adopt more stringent labour migration policies and to introduce voluntary return programmes. This political stance has only partly yielded the desired results, as many EU Member States have reported an increase in irregular employment and in irregular migration flows, as migrants are reluctant to return to their country of origin, where job opportunities and living conditions are generally worse than in Europe. In Spain, for example, few decided to take up the generous package offered to migrants and go back to their country of origin. In February 2009, the Czech Republic also launched a voluntary return programme, mainly intended for non-EU workers, in particular Vietnamese. This too fell short of the government's expectations.

Furthermore, EU employers, squeezed between tighter credit and lower revenue, also prefer to hire irregular migrants, as they are less expensive and easy to dismiss in the event of any further deterioration of the economy. Migrants help to alleviate the problem of the ageing populations of EU Member States, to offset skills shortages, to improve labour market flexibility, to keep wages under control and to contribute to GDP growth. From their point of view, however, job flexibility means that they are more vulnerable than national workers to unexpected changes in business cycles. For example, construction, manufacturing, tourism and restaurants, all of which employ a large proportion of migrants, have been hit hard by the current economic slump. In Denmark, employment in manufacturing fell by 32.8 % between July 2008 and July 2009. In Spain, the construction industry has laid off 24.5 % of its workforce ([27]). Employment reports reveal that migrants were the first to lose their jobs. The International Labour Organisation reports that, worldwide, between 202 million and 221 million people lost their jobs in 2009. This, it says, 'means an increase of almost 34 million over the number of unemployed in 2007' ([28]). Together with the current dramatic turbulence on the financial markets, triggered by the Greek debt crisis and the fragile situation of other EU Member States and the rising sovereign debt of the 16 Member States in the euro area, this all adds up to an economic outlook of uncertainty and macroeconomic weaknesses and imbalances in most parts of the industrialised world, including the USA ([29]). In the words of Nouriel Roubini: 'if I look at the economic picture of the world now, I still see plenty of dark clouds … I'm a realist. I can only see a few bright spots in some countries like China, India or Brazil. But the rest? The US economic recovery has been anaemic, Japan looks comatose, and Europe is facing a double dip. The continent is vulnerable to falling back into recession. Even before the Greek shock, the outlook was rather moderate, but now euro area growth is closer to zero' ([30]).

([26]) The Czech Republic, France, Germany and Italy.

([27]) 'The global economic crisis and migrant workers: impact and response', International Labour Organisation, July 2009, Geneva and 'Migration and the global recession', Migration Policy Institute, September 2009.

([28]) International Labour Organisation, 'Global Employment Trends', January 2010. Available on the Internet (http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_elm/---trends/documents/publication/wcms_120471.pdf).

([29]) Krugman, P., 'Lost decade looming?', *New York Times*, 20 May 2010.

([30]) Interview with *Der Spiegel* on 10 May 2010. Available on the Internet (http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,693991,00.html).

Under the present economic circumstances, therefore, it is difficult to make a strong case for continuing to invest in integration. This case becomes almost impossible to defend considering that some EU Member States have decided to slash their budget expenses in response to their bulging deficits and sovereign debt exposure. The point is that migration and integration are very much part of today's Europe and EU governments should take due account of these two societal components when drawing up their future budget proposals. As noted earlier, those policymakers who predicted a mass return of migrant workers to their country of origin as a result of the crisis were wrong, apart from some isolated cases. In sectors such as manufacturing, construction, catering and tourism, many migrants have become victims of the contraction of employment. This loss of employment, however, has not triggered any substantial returns, as some migrant workers qualify for unemployment benefits, accept low-paid and risky jobs in the informal economy or simply prefer to wait for the storm to pass before looking for new jobs. At the same time, other branches of the economy, including education and healthcare, have maintained, or even expanded, their levels of employment ([31]). This partly explains why migrant workers who have lost their jobs have not opted for voluntary return programmes specifically designed and funded by countries of destination. Before this 'financial 9/11', migrants were helping EU Member States to stimulate economic growth and increase prosperity. They were also helping their country of origin to reduce poverty and promote development with the aid of remittances and knowledge transfers. For these reasons, Europe should look beyond this acute and probably lengthy economic and financial crisis and continue to invest in integration schemes, even with limited resources.

Although this study is not intended to examine the prime determinants of migration, it is important to highlight the main social and economic pull and push factors driving migration flows. With regard to labour migration, expected wage differentials ([32]) and the growing demand for low-skilled and unskilled labour in the host countries are the main reasons why migrants decide to move to another country. In the case of highly skilled workers, other factors play a part in the choice of destination, including diversity ([33]). For other categories of migrant workers, previous colonial bonds, the role of migrant networks, quality of education, higher living standards, political freedom, family reasons, the geographical situation and distance to other countries and advantageous admission policies are also integral parts of the migration equation. The most common socioeconomic push factors are high unemployment, lack of career opportunities, conflicts, ethnic tension, instability, poor governance, persecution, human rights abuses and natural disasters.

([31]) 'The global economic crisis and migrant workers: impact and response', International Labour Organisation, July 2009, Geneva.

([32]) As John Harris and Michael Todaro have shown in their model, expected wage differentials, and not actual wage differentials, encourage workers to migrate. For further information, see Harris, J. and Todaro, M., 'Migration, Unemployment & Development: A Two-Sector Analysis', *American Economic Review*, Vol. 60(1), March 1970, pp. 126–142.

([33]) For further information, see Florida, R., 'The Economic Geography of Talent', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 92, No 4, December 2002, pp. 743–755.

3. Meeting migrants in Madrid

The first survey consisted of interviews with a sample of 131 randomly selected migrants. Each migrants' association had posted announcements on its websites and premises that face-to-face interviews were to be conducted on 10 and 11 November. Consequently, all migrants who participated in this survey had decided for themselves to take part in this exercise. Although no specific question was put to the migrants interviewed on their legal status, it is very likely that those who decided to take part in the survey were lawfully residing migrants and 'regular customers' of the services provided by the migrants' associations. This means that it is improbable that irregular migrants took part in this survey. Many of the respondents said that they lived either in or not far from Madrid. All the migrants interviewed had arrived in Spain over the last 20 years (a limited number of them at the beginning of 2009) and are members of one of the associations that bring together migrants of the same nationality and are part of the Spanish Integration Forum. By accident, the sample is gender-biased as 54 % of the interviewees were female. South and Central America make up 47 % and 11 % of the sample respectively (see Figure 1) ([34]). This comes as no surprise, as ties with former Spanish colonies are still solid and are cemented by a host of bilateral business agreements, including joint ventures and long-term investment. North Africans account for 22 % of the sample or approximately one fifth, which mirrors their share in the geographical distribution of migrants in Madrid. A further 14 % of the interviewees hold dual nationality, although none of the African interviewees did. Some 53 % of the sample hold an upper secondary or higher education certificate, while a further 12 % had obtained a vocational school certificate. The percentage of completely uneducated migrants in the sample is very low at around 5 % (see Figure 2).

([34]) Excluding migrants who also hold Spanish citizenship.

FIGURE 1

Citizenship distribution of the sample



FIGURE 2

Educational attainment



It is interesting to compare the breakdown of migrants by citizenship in the sample with the breakdown for the country as a whole. According to the data collected and processed by the Ministry of Labour and Immigration, on 1 March 2010 there were 4 842 499 migrants lawfully residing in Spain ([35]), which is 7.72 % more than on 1 March 2009. Six of the eight main non-EU nationalities that make up this migrant population are from Latin America, or 24.21 % of the total migrant population. Table 4 shows the breakdown by citizenship of registered non-EU migrants residing legally in Spain on 1 March 2010 ([36]). Another point to stress is that 39.65 % of migrants are citizens of a Member State of the European Union ([37]).

([35]) This figure also includes EU citizens, in particular Romanians who are the second largest group (772 137 or 15.95 % of the total number of migrants). Since 1 March 2009, the number of Romanian migrants has increased by 14.31 %. Over the same period, the number of Italians has risen by 17.01 %, of French by 12.39 % and of Bulgarians by 12.04 %.

([36]) The figures in Table 4 are for 1 March 2010.

([37]) This figure also includes nationals from Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.

This breakdown by citizenship is similar both to the numbers actually registered in Madrid and to the sample analysed. For example, migrants from Latin America make up 70 % of the main non-EU nationalities in Madrid, while the national figure is 75 %. In the sample, migrants from Latin America account for 69 %. As for North Africa, migrants from Morocco make up 16 % at national level, 8 % in Madrid and 19 % in the sample studied ([38]). This means that, although caution and common sense are needed when examining the results from this limited sample and extrapolating lessons from them for future policymaking, the main nationalities of migrants in the sample by and large mirror those actually registered at national level.

TABLE 4

Non–EU nationalities	Total number (1 March 2010)	Percentage of total
Morocco	775 054	16.01
Ecuador	437 279	9.03
Colombia	284 940	5.89
China	154 056	3.18
Peru	143 712	2.97
Bolivia	121 991	2.52
Argentina	96 749	2.00
Dominican Republic	87 185	1.80

Source: Spanish Ministry of Labour and Immigration

To test the behavioural attitudes of migrants, a number of them were asked to write their answers directly on the questionnaire provided, which was drafted in Spanish. Many had problems finding where to write their answers, while a large percentage of migrants from North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa were illiterate. In this context, it is worth mentioning an episode that occurred in one association bringing together migrants from Morocco. Male migrants flatly refused the assistance offered by female migrants to help them fill in the survey. They accepted only the author's neutral hand and the assistance of another male migrant, who in many cases had to translate the questions from Spanish into Arabic.

([38]) Migrants from North Africa make up 22 % of the sample analysed and migrants from Algeria and Egypt the remaining 3 %.

The results from the sample confirm that the percentage of Sub-Saharan and North African migrants with only primary school education (approximately 40 % of each of these two sub-samples) is higher than for South Americans (26 %) and South Americans holding a Spanish passport (19 %). It should be added that between 60 % and 70 % of South and Central Americans, regardless of whether they hold dual citizenship or not, have completed vocational, upper secondary or a higher level of education. This figure drops to 50 % for North Africans and 40 % for Sub-Saharan Africans. A final remark must be made about respondents holding a university degree: the proportion of South Americans amongst all graduate respondents (57 %) is higher than the proportion of South Americans in the sample (47 %), suggesting that South American migrants to Spain tend to be better educated than other nationalities. The proportion of total graduate respondents from other countries, on the other hand, mirrors the composition of the sample.

4. Level of confidence in your own ethnic group

Figure 3 reveals that 90 of the 129 migrants who answered the question have a high level of confidence in their own ethnic group, which is almost 70 % of total interviewees or over two thirds of the total sample interviewed. Only around 20 % of interviewees reported low confidence, while only one woman said she had very low confidence in her ethnic group. Bonds between migrants from the same country and in the same association seem to be strong. This means that there is social capital within one and the same ethnic group, which usually turns into productive and trusting relations between members who cooperate to attain collective goods ([39]). In the case of integration, collective goods can take the form of socioeconomic gains for all migrants targeted. As Nannestad, Haase Svendsen and Tinggaard Svendsen argued in their 2008 paper, the classic collective action dilemma plays a role in the integration equation, as 'there is a strong incentive to free-ride, since the benefits from integration are available to all individuals, whether or not they cooperate in bringing it about' ([40]). These authors contend that social capital, hinging on mutual trust, minimises the risk of free-riding and strengthens relations between members. They added that relations of this kind also benefit from 'the enforcement of social norms that compel people to contribute to collective goods.' Figure 4, which analyses the answers by gender, and Figure 5, which does the same by citizenship, give further information about the stakeholders in social capital. The female migrants interviewed have a higher level of confidence than men. It would be misleading, however, to jump to any sort of conclusions. This result is partly due to the fact that 54 % of all individuals reporting high levels of confidence are women. But Figure 4, for example, shows that the proportion of all women reporting high levels of confidence (68 %) is almost the same as for men (69 %). The same holds true of the results on the low level of confidence. Women and men produced the same result, on 21 % each. Gender seems to be a factor in insufficient levels of confidence, where women account for 70 % of the sub-total.

Turning to nationalities (see Figure 5), 70 % of all South and Central Americans participating in the survey reported very high confidence in their ethnic groups. This percentage moves up to 80 % for Sub-Saharan Africans and to 100 % for the Chinese. The Chinese data come as no surprise, as all the Chinese interviewed were educated entrepreneurs engaged in similar business activities. It could therefore be argued that, while the Chinese sample was uniform, it probably did not represent the majority of Chinese workers in Madrid. Compared with other ethnic groups,

([39]) In the literature, this type of social capital is called 'bonding social capital', which means ties between people in the same group, including family members, friends and neighbours.

([40]) Nannestad, P., Svendsen, G.L. and Svendsen, G.T., 'Bridge over troubled water? Migration and social capital', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 34, No 4, May 2008, pp. 607–631.

North African migrants stand out as different because of the relatively low level of confidence in their own group (only 60 % of them have high confidence) and the high frequency of respondents reporting insufficient confidence (18 % of the total North African sub-sample). They also make up 50 % of all interviewees reporting insufficient levels of confidence. One possible answer could be that, while migrants from Central and South America benefit from long-established communities and associations in Spain, North African migrants are a more disparate group in terms of income, family composition, social and cultural backgrounds and age.

This outcome is consistent with the findings of Alberto Bisin, Eleonora Patacchini and others ([41]), who examined the data from the UK's fourth national survey of ethnic minorities to establish the determinants of religious identity. They found that the integration process for Muslim migrants differs from other ethnic minorities, be they Caribbean, Chinese, Indian or non-Muslim. Put simply, Muslim migrants are 'more resistant' than other ethnic groups to integration schemes, regardless of the time they have spent in the host country. This conclusion contrasts with the results of another study, which was based on a sample of 13 interviews conducted by Andrew C. Gould in Spain and Portugal in 2007 ([42]). Gould contends that 'key Muslim leaders and principal Islamic organisations are seeking to spread views about how Islam and western democracy can and should thrive together' ([43]). Two main reasons stand out. First, in these two Iberian countries there is 'relatively low religious polarisation across [political] parties'. Second, both countries have 'overwhelmingly homogenous Catholic populations.' These two factors have led to a more favourable attitude among Muslim communities, as they see more similarities because of the importance of religion in the lives of the people of these two countries and of the 'de-politicisation of religious matters in the party system.' As for Sub-Saharan migrants, one explanation could be that they enjoy strong bonds and are accustomed to being together as a group, as the majority of them chose to go to Spain on the basis of job opportunities which friends and relatives had told them about before they had even decided to try their luck in Madrid. Nannestad, Haase Svendsen and Tinggaard Svendsen contend that 'immigrants with the lowest stock of family capital rely more on social ties embedded in the ethnic community as a substitute for the social support provided by a family' ([44]). Their findings coincide, by and large, with the results from the sample of Sub-Saharan migrants, who have such a high level of confidence in their own ethnic group (80 %). Since the arrival of Sub-Saharan migrants in Spain is

([41]) Bisin, A., Patacchini, E., Verdier, T. and Zenou, Y., 'Are Muslim immigrants different in terms of cultural integration?', Institute for the Study of Labour, IZA Discussion Paper No 3006, August 2007. Available on the Internet (http://www.iza.org/index_html?lang=en&mainframe=http%3A//www.iza.org/en/webcontent/personnel/photos/index_html%3Fkey%3D2500&topSelect=personnel&subSelect=fellows).

([42]) Gould, A.C., 'Muslim elites and ideologies in Portugal and Spain', *West European Politics*, Vol. 32, No 1, January 2009, pp. 55–76.

([43]) Gould makes it clear that the Muslim communities in Portugal and Spain are 'relatively small and of recent origin compared with Muslim communities in northern Europe.'

([44]) See footnote 40. For additional information, see the report by Mr Jean-Guy Branger 'Immigration from Sub-Saharan Africa', Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Doc. 11526, Strasbourg, 11.2.2008.

a fairly recent phenomenon, family ties are not yet consolidated in the same way as they are among migrants from Central and South America.

FIGURE 3

Level of confidence in the same ethnic group



FIGURE 4

Level of confidence in the same ethnic group, by gender



FIGURE 5


Level of confidence in the same ethnic group, by citizenship
Number of interviewees
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
17
1
5
5
1
4
1
43
15
3
1
9
2
4
10
3
1
2
1
1
1
1
90
1
27
1
10
2
North African
Sub-Saharan African
South American
South American and European
Chinese and European
Central American
Central American and European
N/A
Grand Total
Citizenship
High
Reasonable
Low
Very Low
Insufficient
N/A

5. Do you trust other migrant groups? Do you have Spanish friends?

The second set of questions concern relations between a given ethnic group of migrants and other migrant groups or the Spanish population. More specifically, the survey asked migrants what level of confidence they have in other migrant groups ([45]) and whether they have friends from other migrant groups and Spanish friends ([46]).

Figure 6 shows that 54 of the 131 migrants who answered the question had a high level of confidence in other migrant groups, which equals 41 % of the sample. Contrary to the results obtained by Nannestad, Haase Svendsen and Tinggaard Svendsen, where there was 'a positive spillover effect with respect to trust in outgroups' ([47]), this survey only partly confirms a correlation between trust in migrants' own ethnic group and trust in other migrant groups. For example, 56.7 % of the migrants in the sample who said they placed high confidence in their own ethnic group also had high confidence in other migrant groups, meaning that the other 43.3 % had low confidence in other migrant groups. Some 55 % of all migrants interviewed had low or insufficient confidence in other migrant groups.

Over 56 % of the 131 interviewees (i.e. 74 migrants) replied that they had 'many' friends in other migrant groups. Almost 36 % (47 migrants) said they had 'few' friends, while about 4 % stated that they were 'not interested' in making friends in other migrant communities and 3 % said they had no friends. Almost 50 % (65 migrants) said that they had 'few' Spanish friends, while over 47 % had 'many' Spanish friends. Only 1.5 % of the interviewees were 'not interested' in making Spanish friends.

([45]) The survey included an open question, as the objective was not to single out any particular migrant group or specific religious group within the migrant community of Madrid but to see whether migrants who trust their own group were more willing to express a similar level of trust in other groups, regardless of their national, cultural and religious backgrounds.

([46]) The questionnaire drew no distinction between acquaintances and friends. The former suggests a more casual and less personal relationship.

([47]) In the literature, this is called 'bridging social capital'.

FIGURE 6



Analysis of these two sets of replies suggests that the migrants interviewed drew a clear distinction between the 'vague' concept of trust in undefined migrant communities in Madrid and their 'real' friendships with other migrants. For example, an almost identical percentage said that, while they had low or insufficient confidence in other migrant groups, they had 'many' friends from other migrant communities. A similar dichotomy can be found when comparing the percentage of those who have 'many' migrant friends with those who have 'few' Spanish friends. Over half of the interviewees had 'many' migrant friends but almost half of them had 'few' Spanish friends. Since 86.5 % of the sample had either a very good or good command of Spanish, it follows that having a limited number of Spanish friends is not due to any kind of language barrier ([48]). One explanation can be found by looking at the geographical density of the migrant population in Madrid, which is concentrated mainly in a limited number of neighbourhoods. This means that migrants are far more likely to mingle with other migrant groups than with the local population. Figure 7 offers another explanation: the number of extra-work activities pursued by migrants ([49]). The rationale behind this question was to see whether migrants had other opportunities to mix with the local population outside work and to participate in the 'official' integration activities promoted at local level ([50]).

([48]) The survey included a specific question on the migrants' command of Spanish. Almost 59 % have 'very good' knowledge of Spanish, while 27.5 % have a 'good' command. Some 12 % have 'satisfactory' knowledge of Spanish and the remaining 1.5 % have an 'inadequate' command.
([49]) Although the survey did not ask for specifics, most migrants who replied to this question provided a precise list of their extra-work activities.
([50]) In Madrid, the Spanish government, with the assistance of the City Council, has put together specific programmes and activities targeting migrants on the street or without a permanent residence in a bid to foster their integration into the socioeconomic fabric of Spanish society.

FIGURE 7



A large number of migrants (50 %) had no time for extra-work activities, as the economic crisis had forced them to take on extra jobs to make ends meet. Others replied that they had no time to pursue their hobbies, as they had to help their children and, sometimes, older relatives. 35 % of the sample had one or two recreational activities, ranging from sports to other pastimes. Amongst the 15 % of the sample who had three or more activities, at least one of them was voluntary work, especially for non-profit organisations. This means that half the migrants interviewed had few opportunities to meet the local population outside work or to participate in the official integration activities. In this light, it is quite surprising that over 47 % of the sample replied that they had 'many' Spanish friends. It can therefore be concluded that a large percentage were encouraged to make friends both outside their own ethnic group and with the local population. This positive, proactive approach was most probably shaped by the programmes and activities ([51]) specifically designed for migrants by the central government and the regional and local authorities. As Anu Masso put it in her article ([52]) there is a need for multicultural communication skills to integrate newcomers, in particular where ethnic minorities are perceived as 'different' by the host society. The proportion of respondents in the sample with many friends does not change significantly depending whether they have good or satisfactory knowledge of Spanish (40 % of the respondents claimed a good or satisfactory command and 58 % a very good knowledge of Spanish). On the other hand, those who said they have an insufficient command of Spanish (only 2 % of the sample) have 'few' Spanish friends. Some 90 % of the interviewees who have many friends, and 82 % of those who have few, have a very good or good command of Spanish. Anu Masso also added that the host society should invest in individuals' readiness to accept migrants, not just in the macro-environment where individuals live. Investment in inclusion and education policies and in social capital is needed to help the host society to accept newcomers more readily. To this end, the Spanish government and Madrid City Council have

([51]) These integration schemes include language and vocational training.
([52]) Masso, A., 'A readiness to accept immigrants in Europe? Individual and country-level characteristics', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 35, No 2, February 2009, pp. 251–270.

put in place, without encroaching on their respective areas of jurisdiction, specific measures designed to increase civic, social, cultural and political participation in the integration process, as it was clear to all stakeholders that integration is a two-way process ([53]), that integration schemes should target citizens and migrants alike and that integration issues should be gradually mainstreamed into other areas of public policy.

([53]) See footnote 7.

6. Have you been a victim of discrimination?

Since they arrived in Madrid, 43 % of the migrants interviewed (56 of them) had suffered no discrimination, whereas 18.3 % of the sample, or 24 people, had been the victim of discrimination once, 13.7 %, or 18 people, twice and 24.5 %, or 32 people, more than twice ([54]). Figure 8 provides details of the number of incidents of discrimination reported during the interviews.

FIGURE 8



Figure 9 shows 'where' the discrimination occurred. The high percentage (46 %) of interviewees who did not specify any location largely reflects the group who had never been discriminated against (43.5 % of the sample). Not counting these individuals, the vast majority of the interviewees reported that they had been discriminated against while at work or when looking for a job. The low proportion of interviewees who stated they had endured discrimination at school or university partly reflects the proportion who had been educated in Spain. The predominance of 'upper secondary school' in all frequency categories reflects the relatively high number of interviewees reporting this level of education. Migrants with upper secondary education account for about 40 % to 60 % of all respondents in all frequency categories. This is consistent with the 53 % of the sample with upper secondary education. Similarly, migrants with 'compulsory secondary or primary school' education make up around 30 % in all frequency categories. Both results could suggest the absence of any correlation between the

([54]) Migrants replying that they had suffered no discrimination or only once since they arrived in Spain had been in Spain for more than 10 years.

type of education completed and the number of incidents of discrimination. On the other hand, several interviewees had suffered from discrimination at work and recurrently, as 48 % of the victims of discrimination at work reported more than two episodes, making up 37 % of the total sub-sample claiming to have endured discrimination.

FIGURE 9



From the number of interviewees reporting discrimination, gender does not seem to play a role (see Figure 10). Approximately the same number of women and men reported incidents of discrimination (i.e. an equal number of male and female respondents said they had been discriminated against 'once', 'twice' and 'more than twice'). More women, however, reported two or more episodes of discrimination, which could be a consequence of the gender composition of the sample ([55]). On the other hand, the difference between male and female interviewees seems more statistically significant for the sub-sample reporting 'zero discrimination', as women (33) outnumbered men (23).

([55]) Some 54 % of the migrants interviewed were female.

FIGURE 10



No conclusive evidence emerged from the analysis of the relationship between discrimination and citizenship. The results, which are summarised in Figure 11, reveal a significant split between migrants who had never been victims of discrimination and those who had been discriminated against more than twice (dark green and bright green columns respectively). This pattern is quite standard for most citizenship categories with the exception of Central Americans. For example, 60 % of the Central American migrants interviewed and all Central Americans holding a Spanish passport said they had never been discriminated against while in Spain. But amongst migrants from North Africa, while some 50 % had endured no discrimination, an equivalent proportion had been discriminated against twice or more. About 80 % of South Americans holding a Spanish passport, 60 % of Sub-Saharan Africans and 75 % of Chinese nationals with dual citizenship reported two or more cases of discrimination.

FIGURE 11


Discrimination by citizenship
Number of interviewees
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
North African
Sub-Saharan African
South American
South American & European
Central American
Central American & European
Chinese & European
N/A
Never
Once
Twice
More than twice
N/A

7. Meeting integration practitioners in Madrid

To preserve anonymity, the names of the representatives of migrants' associations, trade unions, non-profit organisations and charities who kindly accepted to take part in the survey will not be disclosed. Suffice it to say that the group of migrants' associations, non-profit organisations and charities make up over 60 % of all the agencies in Madrid working exclusively on meeting migrants' needs and helping them to solve problems ranging from jobs, work or residence permits and accommodation to schooling, vocational training and care services.

This survey, specifically designed for integration practitioners, set out to establish the academic and professional profiles of the practitioners operating in Madrid and their command of foreign languages, to understand the most pressing needs of migrants in a city that has seen a mass influx in the last decade and has been hit hard by the current international economic and financial crisis and to collect any suggestions and ideas those practitioners have to improve socioeconomic integration of migrants into the fabric of Madrid.

The first self-assessment question concerned the professional and academic profiles of practitioners in relation to their normal daily duties. Figure 12 provides a percentage breakdown of this self-assessment. Some 57 % considered their professional and academic background to be very good, while 37 % felt that, although they have an adequate background, they would benefit from specific training courses on integration issues designed to hone their professional skills and help them deliver a higher quality of service. Some 6 % of the sample had no views on this matter.

FIGURE 12

Self-assessment: professional and academic profile of practitioners interviewed in Madrid



FIGURE 13

Self-assessment: command of foreign languages



Figure 13 gives a detailed picture of the second self-assessment question on command of a foreign language. Almost a third of the sample felt that their knowledge of a foreign language was 'very good' or 'good', while a quarter rated it 'satisfactory' ([56]). Some 19 % of the practitioners who spoke two or more foreign languages considered their command of the first foreign language to be 'good' and of the second foreign language 'satisfactory'. The remaining 25 % had inadequate knowledge or no knowledge of any foreign language.

The third self-assessment question dealt with the 'quality' of working relations with migrants, be they occasional or regular customers (see Figure 14). Some 75 % of the sample rated their working contacts with migrants 'very good' or 'good', underlining that these relations were based on 'mutual trust'. Some 6 % felt that their contacts with migrants were simply 'good', while 19 % preferred not to judge the nature of their working relations with migrants.

FIGURE 14

Self-assessment: working relations with migrants



Combining the last three graphs, almost half of the 57 % of practitioners who considered their academic and professional profile to be 'very good' speak one or two

([56]) For the purpose of this survey, 'satisfactory' was defined as the ability to express one's own ideas using very simple terminology.

foreign languages and they almost all felt that their working relations with migrants were 'very good' and based on 'mutual trust'. Over half of the 57 % of practitioners who considered their academic and professional profile to be 'very good' had a 'very good' command of a foreign language ([57]). Almost 80 % of the 31 % of practitioners who considered their academic and professional profile to be 'good' but who felt they needed 'specific training' had no knowledge of a foreign language. Almost 67 % of the 19 % of the sample who gave no self-assessment of their working relations with migrants had defined their academic and professional profiles as 'very good'. It can be argued from these self-assessments that the academic and professional profiles of the integration practitioners operating in Madrid are, by and large, 'very good' and that they have a good command of foreign languages ([58]). Another point to be stressed is the genuine commitment of the practitioners interviewed who spend long hours and expend much energy on finding solutions and lending a helping hand to migrants in need. The dedication of these practitioners, combined with the assistance and sometimes financial support they provide, has made for high-quality working relations, particularly marked by respect and mutual trust. This human capital should be valued more and built up over time, as these committed practitioners can really help needy and sometimes desperate migrants to find a solution that would have been out of their reach.

Figure 15 indicates, in order of priority, the most pressing requests made by migrants in their contacts with representatives of migrants' associations, non-profit organisations, charities and trade unions over the period from January to October 2009. As mentioned earlier, in times of crisis, migrants are the first to lose their jobs, as the report by the International Labour Organisation shows. As a result, the first problem migrants had to face was to look for a new job in order not to lose their residence and work permits ([59]). This emerged as the number one concern in this survey, followed by job opportunities and the call for more integration schemes.

([57]) Mainly English.
([58]) Some 63 % of the sample.
([59]) Under Spanish legislation, migrants who lose their jobs have three months to look for another.

FIGURE 15



Moving on to the last question in the survey, entitled 'spontaneous comments', 40 % of the migrants' associations and non-profit organisations came up with no ideas or suggestions. The other 60 % of the sample voiced concerns and put forward proposals, directed almost entirely at improving current weaknesses, at assisting migrants more effectively and at enhancing the quality of their services to migrants. The majority of this 60 % made it clear that more effort was needed to promote social inclusion, to defend the rights of migrants and to safeguard equal opportunities, in particular in times of economic crisis. They added that more financial resources were also needed to help migrants who have lost their jobs, and sometimes their homes, to weather the temporary economic hardship. For example, two non-profit organisations said they were unable to accommodate more migrants in their facilities in and outside Madrid, as the demand had hit an unprecedented high during the first eight months of 2009. They also mentioned that some migrant families were forced to move in with relatives, as they were no longer able to pay the rent. This group also felt that their associations were now more exposed to anti-immigrant sentiment, which tended to come to the surface in times of economic and social crisis. Some 20 % of the 60 %

who added comments drew attention to the occupational distribution of migrant workers in Madrid to highlight the job opportunities open to migrants.

While conceding that employment opportunities in construction, manufacturing, tourism and restaurants have been reduced by the economic slump, this limited group of integration practitioners pointed out that job opportunities in healthcare, domestic aid and, to some extent, agriculture have been on the increase, as Spanish nationals, in particular those entitled to long-term unemployment benefits, continue to spurn low-skilled and low-paid jobs. According to the data released by the International Labour Organisation in July 2009, 19.5 % of the jobs in the health and social work sector in Denmark go to migrant workers, 15.2 % in the Netherlands and 19.3 % in Sweden. The report also confirmed that few migrants have lost their jobs in these sectors since the start of the economic crisis ([60]). One conclusion that can be drawn is that the integration practitioners geared their remarks more to finding a solution to a given problem than to complaining about the difficulties and coordination issues they are called upon to solve. While many of them did indeed highlight the problems created by the transfer of responsibility for migration and integration from the central government to the 17 autonomous regional authorities, none said that this less than satisfactory situation had stopped them from doing their jobs. The vast majority were happy with the assistance they had received from the central government and Madrid City Council, which had helped them to do their jobs efficiently and effectively. They also underlined that the Spanish authorities are working towards a common goal, which is to increase participation by migrants in shaping the integration process.

([60]) 'The global economic crisis and migrant workers: impact and response', International Labour Organisation, July 2009, Geneva.

8. Concluding remarks

(a) The central government and the regional and local authorities

Although the distribution of responsibilities and tasks in the area of migration and integration has, in the past, given rise to tension between the central government and the autonomous regions, the 'Madrid sample' revealed that this two-layer decision-making model can work if the stakeholders engaged in making migration and integration strategies beneficial to citizens and migrants alike share and pursue common objectives ([61]). One explanation could be that, since integration is a dynamic process occurring in big cities and small villages alike, including rural areas, regional and local authorities are the 'natural' partners in this process given their knowledge of the resident population, of the labour and housing markets and of the range of activities and services on offer, including schooling, care and social assistance, and their geographical proximity when it comes to decision-making. In other words, regional and local authorities have a more thorough understanding of indigenous situations and are therefore in a better position to devise and implement specific policy responses. Regional and local authorities are also the 'preferred partners' of migrants' associations, charities and non-profit organisations, which contribute to the dynamics of integration processes by providing up-to-date information and input into policymaking with the aim of improving the outcome of integration schemes ([62]). Pressure of this kind has also made these authorities more responsive to changes in their initial approaches, whenever integration schemes in a given area so require. This means that regional and local authorities can be more flexible in responding to calls from integration stakeholders and civil society and more sensitive to the ever-changing challenges posed by integration.

Turning to the level of migration law, the central government in Spain enjoys exclusive jurisdiction and needs to ensure consistency and clarity in the legal framework, especially with regard to the rights and duties of non-EU citizens and the volumes of non-EU nationals admitted. It has adopted a top-down approach, which has not, however, stopped social and non-governmental organisations and charities from making an invaluable contribution to policymaking on migration. This means that, while retaining exclusive jurisdiction over migration law and the legal framework within which integration policies must be developed and implemented, the Spanish government has heeded the calls from the various stakeholders. The Spanish government also needs to comply with the norms and principles defined and

([61]) It should be stressed that between Spain's two biggest political parties, the Socialist Party, which currently runs the central government, and the People's Party, which currently runs Madrid City Council and the autonomous region of Madrid, views diverge on the wisdom of giving unlawful migrants access to welfare services.

([62]) Note that the central government also funds non-governmental organisations and charities directly.

agreed at European level. It must be stressed that, with the ratification of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union ([63]), Europe now holds greater responsibility for decision-making and for developing policies and measures on migration and integration ([64]). In this institutional setting, it is vital for Spain to retain exclusive jurisdiction over migration, as only the central government can play a major role in Europe and make the voice of migration stakeholders heard, ensure consistency and clarity in the legal framework and have a comprehensive view of the country's ever-changing labour needs.

To improve coordination between the central government and regional and local authorities, where dissimilar approaches can sometimes lead to 'turf wars' and to poor policy outcomes, cooperation mechanisms should be carefully assessed in the light of current shortcomings with a view to overcoming the problems stemming from the double-layer approach. In this context, it is worth underlining the role played by the 'Fund supporting the integration of migrants' ([65]), which enables the central government and the regional and local authorities to improve coordination when implementing integration schemes. In times of severe economic and financial crisis, which will affect Europe's economic landscape in the years ahead, it would be unwise to propose setting up new government bodies, which could encounter similar coordination problems. To address existing drawbacks, the starting point should be rigorous monitoring based on integration and migration indicators, which should be jointly developed by the central government and regional and local authorities. A joint political decision could then be taken in an effort to find a constructive and lasting solution. This might seem to be an easy cure to the current 'coordination diseases', but it will be politically difficult and painful. From a political point of view, it would be much easier to scrap existing bodies, including the Forum and the Sectoral Conference on Immigration, and set up a new institution to address issues of this kind and make things work better. However, this cosmetic change would hardly provide a solution to existing problems. The proposed solution, namely to identify and correct drawbacks, calls for strong political commitment from all major political parties, an objective and rigorous analysis of the root causes of existing coordination issues and the involvement of stakeholders who need to report their experience, including instances where the current coordination setting has failed to produce the desired results.

Another point to stress is the way the central government allocates public funds earmarked for integration directly to non-governmental organisations, migrants' associations and charities. Public tenders enable the central government to complete the selection procedure within six months and thus allocate funds to integration

([63]) The Lisbon Treaty was signed on 13 December 2007 and entered into force on 1 December 2009.

([64]) However, Article 79(5) specifies that Member States will continue 'to determine volumes of admission of third-country nationals coming from third countries to their territory in order to seek work, whether employed or self-employed.' Consolidated version of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, OJ C 83, 30.3.2010, p. 47.

([65]) Fondo de apoyo para la acogida e integración de inmigrantes.

stakeholders who will spend them in the following year. This solution, however, calls for stringent *ex-post* monitoring of expenses and the results achieved to assess whether the organisation selected has delivered the measures agreed with the public authorities, be they national, regional or local. Since the nature of integration challenges varies from one country to another, and even within national boundaries, public authorities should not be afraid to test unchartered waters in a bid to find innovative solutions that might challenge the status quo. While consolidating the legitimacy of their political choices, public authorities need to consider new avenues for integration, which could consist of a blend of legislative and non-legislative measures designed to improve ties between migrant communities and their working and social environment.

(b) Some lessons to be learned from the survey

The results of this survey paint a fairly encouraging picture of integration of non-EU nationals into the socioeconomic fabric of Madrid. According to the European Economic Forecast published in spring 2010 by the European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs ([66]), the economic fundamentals of Spain between mid-November 2009, when the survey was carried out, and spring 2010 have not changed significantly, in particular in terms of unemployment ([67]). Having said that, it could be argued that Spanish workers' perception of the socioeconomic situation has turned negative as trade unions decided to call a strike in the public sector on 8 June 2010 to voice their concerns and frustration over the economic strategy put together by the Spanish government ([68]).

Although not comprehensive, the sample provides a cross-national view of the integration process in Madrid. The survey explores how migrants relate to each other and to other ethnic groups, whether they are engaged in extra-curricular activities, how good their command of Spanish is and whether they have been victims of discrimination. The survey also examines the academic and professional profiles of integration practitioners and highlights the most pressing needs voiced by migrants who turn to migrants' associations, non-governmental organisations and charities for assistance.

The Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration drawn up by the Spanish government for the period 2007–10 can be said to have made considerable headway towards promoting closer integration and raising awareness around a complex societal process, which is sometimes overlooked by political stakeholders. The same holds true for the two programmes that Madrid City Council has put together in an effort

([66]) European Economic Forecast, spring 2010, European Economy 2/2010 (provisional version), EU Commission. Available on the Internet (http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2010/pdf/ee-2010-2_en.pdf).

([67]) According to Eurostat, in November 2009 Spain had an unemployment rate of 19.4 %, which increased slightly to 19.7 % in April 2010. For further information, see http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/3-08012010-AP/EN/3-08012010-AP-EN.PDF and http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/3-01062010-AP/EN/3-01062010-AP-EN.PDF

([68]) To reduce its public deficit, the Spanish government has also decided salary cuts in the public sector.

to achieve greater social inclusion and fight discrimination. Mention should also be made, in this context, of the 'Survey on living together in the city of Madrid in 2009' ([69]) conducted by the City Council. One of the results of this survey is that, between 2005 and 2009, the percentage of people living in Madrid who were 'clearly in favour' of the presence of migrants increased from 24.7 % to 44.9 %, even though the signs of the current economic crisis were already visible and tangible. Taking discrimination as another measure of integration, the survey shows that the number of incidents of discrimination fell as a result of integration schemes over the same period. The Forum for the Social Integration of Immigrants and other social platforms offer migrant communities credible and reliable partners to talk to and make them feel that they are part of a dynamic and multi-faceted process that will shape their working and social relations with the host society in the years ahead. Spain has sent out a forward-looking message that is also a long-term investment in the structure and composition of its society, which in turn has been and will continue to be shaped by the overwhelming forces of today's highly interdependent world where greater human mobility is inescapable. As Robert Park wrote in 1928, 'The influences of migrations have not been limited, of course, by the changes which they have effected in existing cultures. In the long run, they have determined the racial characteristics of historical peoples' ([70]). European societies need to realise that migration flows are part and parcel of life today and that more resources and time are therefore needed to develop integration processes across Europe in an effort to promote inclusion of newcomers and minimise the despicable outbreaks of violence, racism and xenophobia that continue to occur in some EU Member States. Dialogue, understanding, practical measures and best practices should underpin a structured dialogue between migrants and associations and between citizens and authorities at various levels. In the case of Madrid, this policy strategy has generated social capital in migrant communities, which has had a positive spillover effect on society, as the number of migrants who have been victims of discrimination is not as large as it could well have been in the current economic circumstances. The results also indicate that the social capital generated by the integration schemes implemented in Madrid has shown some resilience as the economic crisis in Spain has deteriorated, as two thirds of the migrants interviewed placed a high level of trust in their own ethnic group. According to the sample, however, a high percentage of migrant women (70 %), in particular Muslim women, have an insufficient level of confidence in their own group. This means that the social capital created in one ethnic group as a result of specific integration schemes is the 'social reward' gained by that specific ethnic group. In other words, policymaking and future integration schemes need to take full account of the specifics of each ethnic group and to adapt

([69]) Spanish title: 'Encuesta sobre la convivencia en la ciutad de Madrid 2009'. Available on the Internet (http://www.munimadrid.es/UnidadesDescentralizadas/CooperacionEInmigracion/Inmigracion/Ficheros/Encuestaconv.pdf).

([70]) Park, R.E., 'Human migration and the marginal man', *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 33, No 6, May 1928, pp. 881–893.

their strategy accordingly if they want to produce group-related social capital that is the 'fruit' of trust, cooperation and social interaction within each group. Public authorities in Spain should therefore pay careful attention to the results of this survey and reach out to Muslim women in a bid to build more trust between them and their ethnic community. One idea might be to develop activities to foster community participation in urban and suburban areas, which can be put together by migrants' associations and local institutions and networks. Integration schemes of this kind need to be backed by comprehensive awareness-raising campaigns, which should target a large number of Muslim women. These women need to be engaged in community participation projects, which could be designed, for example, to improve their communication skills and their commitment to their own communities and neighbourhoods. As Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis have stressed, 'the frequency of interaction among community members lowers the cost and raises the benefits associated with discovering more about the characteristics, recent behaviour and likely future actions of other members... communities overcome free-rider problems by members directly punishing antisocial actions of others' ([71]). In other words, these two scholars argue that the formation of social capital can also have positive spillover effects on community governance.

As for 'bridging social capital', to use the term employed in the article by Nannestad, Haase Svendsen and Tinggaard Svendsen, the result is less encouraging. This is partly due to the fact that bridging social capital takes longer to generate and is more fragile, as it means building stronger ties between different ethnic groups. In other words, it takes time to accumulate, but it can be depleted very quickly. Despite these challenges, bridging social capital is essential for any multi-ethnic society if it wants to cultivate lasting social inclusion and break down barriers to dialogue, cooperation and mutual trust between various ethnic groups. Europe has become the cradle of a highly dynamic multi-ethnic society and it needs to invest in integration schemes targeting bridging social capital. For example, any activity or measure designed to bring together different migrant communities around a given project is likely to increase trust, dialogue and cooperation, thereby sowing the seeds for bridging social capital ([72]). In other words, increasing the number of opportunities for different groups to relate to one another matters and it is vital to set the 'integration ball' rolling. Another point to stress is that the current economic crisis has made it more difficult for migrants to engage in extra-work activities, which usually create opportunities for people to mix with other migrant and local communities. For example, only 35%

([71]) Bowles, S. and Gintis, H., 'Social Capital and Community Governance', *The Economic Journal*, Vol. 112, No 483, November 2002, pp. F419–F436. This article defines communities as 'a group of people who interact directly, frequently and in multi-faceted ways.'

([72]) For a practical example of how people from different backgrounds have come to work together, see Nelson, B.J., Kaboolian, L. and Carver, K.A., 'Bridging Social Capital and An Investment Theory of Collective Action: Evidence from The Concord Project', American Political Science Association, Chicago, 3.9.2004. Available on the Internet (http://www.sppsr.ucla.edu/pdf/apsabridgingsep1904.pdf). Other examples of best practices at European level can be found on the Europa portal on integration (http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/en/index.cfm).

of the sample said they had one or two recreational activities, including voluntary work to assist non-profit organisations.

Turning to discrimination, the sample shows that 43% of the migrants interviewed, or 56 people, had suffered no form of discrimination since they arrived in Madrid. This result ties in with the findings of the survey conducted by Madrid City Council over the period 2005–09. For example, 44.9 % of the people interviewed said they were 'clearly in favour' of migrants. On the one hand, this encouraging outcome hints at the effectiveness of the integration schemes implemented by public authorities with the assistance of migrants' associations, non-governmental organisations, charities, trade unions and other stakeholders. On the other, 56.5 % had been victims of at least one episode of discrimination, in particular at work or when looking for a job. The survey seems to suggest that the workplace is where migrants are more often victims of discrimination, with more than two instances. These victims make up 37 % of the migrants reporting cases of discrimination. This means that work in some areas of Madrid breeds discrimination and that the integration strategies put in place need to be developed to eradicate this kind of discrimination ([73]). Gender does not seem to play a part in discrimination, as almost equal numbers of men and women reported cases. Gender comes to the fore to the extent that the number of women who have never been discriminated against is higher than the number of men. Nor does citizenship seem to play a role in identifying future victims of discrimination. With the sole exception of Central Americans, who were less discriminated against, some 80 % of South Americans holding a Spanish passport, 60 % of Sub-Saharan Africans and 75 % of Chinese nationals with dual citizenship reported two or more cases of discrimination. Obviously, it would be short-sighted and unfair to point the finger at the quality of the programmes implemented by the Spanish public authorities as the reason why discrimination continues to bubble beneath the surface of everyday life in Spain.

Given the mass influx of migrants within such a short period, the Spanish authorities are to be congratulated on their remarkable achievements in Madrid. To fight discrimination, Europe and its Member States need to continue to devise specific integration schemes, in the form of awareness-raising campaigns targeting different areas of the host society and measures that make dialogue and interaction between citizens and migrants easier and more sustainable over time. Integration schemes of this kind also need to be backed by judgments of the national courts and the European Court of Human Rights, which must punish racism, xenophobia and other forms of discrimination ([74]).

([73]) The Europe 2020 strategy points out that 'The employment rate of the population aged 20–64 should increase from the current 69 % to at least 75 %, including through the greater involvement of women, older workers and the better integration of migrants in the workforce'. For further information, see European Commission, 'Europe 2020: A European strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth', SEC(2010) 246 final, Brussels, 4.3.2010. Available on the Internet (http://ec.europa.eu/eu2020/pdf/COMPLET%20EN%20BARROSO%20%20%20007%20-%20Europe%202020%20-%20EN%20version.pdf).

([74]) For a critique of the current European judicial system to protect human rights and fight racism, see Dembour, M.B., 'Still silencing the racism suffered by migrants … the limits of current developments under Article 14 ECHR', *European Journal of Migration and Law*, Vol. 11, 2009, pp. 221–234.

One last comment concerns integration practitioners. According to their self-assessments, the academic and professional profiles of integration practitioners working in Madrid are, by and large, 'very good' and include a good command of a foreign language. The survey also reveals the genuine commitment of the practitioners interviewed, who are ready and willing to go the extra mile to find solutions and lend a helping hand to migrants in need. The dedication of these practitioners is the foundation to be built upon and the Spanish authorities need to continue to underpin their valuable work with political backing and funding. In other words, it would not be in the general interest of Spain's multi-ethnic society to limit the impact of the work of integration practitioners, who invest so much energy and time to help migrants, by reducing their funding.

(c) Looking ahead

Europe's current socioeconomic circumstances are marked by austerity measures ([75]), uncertainty and sometimes frustration and do not seem particularly conducive to promoting integration and social inclusion. Unemployment is also likely to remain high in the next few months as a result of weak economic growth and this could set the stage for growing anti-immigrant sentiment, not to mention strikes and other forms of social protest. Against this background, making a strong case for keeping the same level of financial commitment to integration appears almost impossible. But despite this objective economic difficulty, integration schemes should not be cut back, neither in number nor in scope, as migrants will continue to live and work in Madrid. As mentioned earlier, few migrants decided to go back to their country of origin in response to the generous incentives offered by the government. In other words, the integration challenge has not gone away with the outbreak of this deep economic crisis. On the contrary, it could be argued that integration schemes are all the more necessary because of the deteriorating economic circumstances, which could pit one group against another for the limited number of jobs available. At the end of the interviews, four migrants' associations asked the author to stay for an informal meeting with the migrants who had taken part in the survey ([76]). Apart from a few complaints, most of the migrants interviewed said that all they wanted were jobs, decent accommodation for their families and the possibility of offering schooling and training to their children. It is easy to appreciate this 'wish list' in the face of growing unemployment and the forthcoming austerity measures ([77]). This list, however, provides a 'common denominator' on which Spain and migrants can build and shape their common future. Gaps and shortcomings identified in the integration schemes also need to be addressed. Parts that have fallen short of expectations will

([75]) For example, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom are all set to adopt measures to cut public sector spending in the next few years.

([76]) Four migrants' associations bringing together Central and South American nationals. Lack of time prevented other associations from organising similar meetings.

([77]) The Spanish government has adopted an austerity package to the tune of EUR 15 billion. The bill was passed with only a one-vote majority, 169 to 168.

have to be corrected to make them cost-effective and focus more on migrants in need. Social networks need to be consolidated and, wherever possible, extended to provide assistance to migrants who have been hit hard by the economic crisis. In other words, integration channels should remain open to include migrants and to continue to build trust and increase cooperation between stakeholders. Austerity measures are needed to restore the confidence of financial markets, to keep the deficit at bay and to reduce public sector spending. Integration schemes, however, should not be seen as 'expenses', but as forward-looking investment in cohesion and equal opportunities in Spain's multi-ethnic society. Turning a deaf ear to calls for integration is very likely to undermine the highly positive results that the Spanish public authorities have attained so far with the aid of all stakeholders involved, including migrants. Under no circumstances can a government afford to throw out the baby with the bath water.

ANNEX I

The following questions were put to the migrants interviewed:

1. What is your level of confidence in your ethnic group?
2. What is your level of confidence in other migrant groups?
3. How many Spanish friends do you have?
4. How many migrant friends, who are not in your ethnic group, do you have?
5. Are you engaged in extra-work activities?
6. How do you assess your command of Spanish?
7. Have you ever been a victim of discrimination?
8. If yes, where?
9. Can you please tell us your educational attainments?

ANNEX II

The following questions were put to the integration practitioners interviewed:

1. How do you assess your academic and professional background in relation to your duties?
2. How do you assess your work relations with migrants, be they regular or occasional customers?
3. What have been the most pressing requests from migrants in 2009?
4. Do you speak a foreign language?
5. How do you assess your knowledge of your first foreign language?

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